What types of robot security solutions exist?
Three categories cover the field. Endpoint detection and intrusion detection watch a robot or its network and raise alerts. Identity and access management authenticates participants and controls who can connect. Verifiable attestation authorizes each high-consequence action before it happens and records a tamper-evident receipt. Middleware security (SROS2, DDS-Security) and network segmentation sit underneath all three as foundational hygiene.
| Capability | Detection / IDS | IAM / identity | Verifiable attestation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary job | Spot and report suspicious activity | Authenticate participants and manage access | Authorize each action and prove what happened |
| Prevents an unauthorized physical action | No (alerts after) | Partial (who, not each action) | Yes (deny-by-default before motion) |
| Per-robot hardware-rooted identity | No | Sometimes | Yes |
| Tamper-evident action evidence | No (editable logs) | No | Yes (RFC 6962 receipts) |
| Post-quantum ready | N/A | Rarely | Yes (composite ML-DSA) |
| Complements ROS 2 / SROS2 | Yes | Yes | Yes |
These are complementary, not mutually exclusive. The table is a way to see which job each does, so you can tell where your current coverage ends.
How does robot EDR or IDS differ from attestation?
Detection tells you a robot may have been compromised; attestation controls and proves what it was authorized to do. Endpoint and intrusion detection are reactive: they observe behavior and alert when something looks wrong, which is valuable but happens after the fact, and the logs they rely on can be edited by an attacker who owns the device.
Verifiable attestation is preventive and tamper-evident. It puts a deny-by-default gate in front of the actuator and seals each decision to an append-only transparency log. Run both: detection widens your visibility, attestation adds the verifiable authorization and provenance that detection cannot provide.
Why isn’t network security enough for robots?
Because an encrypted, authenticated link still carries whatever command is sent over it. Transport security (TLS, DDS-Security, VPNs) protects the channel, but it does not decide whether a specific physical action is allowed, and it does not produce evidence of who authorized it. A hijacked but still-encrypted teleoperation link, or a manipulated vision-language-action model, can push a technically valid command that the robot should never execute.
Network security is necessary foundational hygiene. Attestation adds the missing control: per-command authorization keyed to a per-robot identity, plus a receipt. The two operate at different layers and reinforce each other.
What should a robot security solution actually do?
A complete approach answers three questions: is this the right robot, is this action allowed, and can we prove it. That means per-robot hardware-rooted identity, a pre-actuation authorization decision, and tamper-evident provenance, layered on top of sound network and middleware security and paired with detection for visibility.
- Identity: each robot cryptographically distinct, so clones and spoofs fail. See robot identity.
- Authorization: deny-by-default before motion, resilient to prompt injection and command injection.
- Evidence: verifiable receipts for auditors, regulators, and insurers.
How does RankShield compare to detection-only tools?
RankShield adds the verifiable authorization and provenance layer that detection-only tools do not have, and it runs alongside them. If your current stack is detection plus network security, you can see and react to problems but you cannot prevent an unauthorized action at the actuator or produce tamper-evident proof of what a robot did. RankShield fills exactly that gap.
We are deliberate about not overclaiming: no system is unhackable, RankShield does not replace your robot stack, and it complements SROS2, DDS, and detection rather than competing with them. What it uniquely provides is the pre-actuation gate and the RFC 6962 receipt. See how the platform works.
How do you choose the right approach for your fleet?
Start from what you must be able to prove and what you must be able to stop. If you only need visibility, detection may be enough today. If a robot acting on an unauthorized command would cause physical harm, or if an auditor, regulator, or insurer will ask you to prove a robot acted within policy, you need the verifiable-attestation layer, and you need it in front of the actuator.
Most mature fleets end up with all three: network and middleware security as the base, detection for visibility, and attestation for prevention and evidence. If you want help mapping your current coverage to the gaps, request early access and we will scope it with you.
Frequently asked questions
Is verifiable attestation a replacement for robot EDR?
No. Detection and attestation do different jobs and work best together. Detection spots and alerts on suspicious behavior; attestation authorizes each action before motion and produces tamper-evident evidence. Run both.
Do I still need network security if I have attestation?
Yes. Network and middleware security (TLS, SROS2, DDS-Security, segmentation) are foundational hygiene. Attestation adds per-command authorization and provenance on top; it does not replace transport security.
What makes attestation evidence better than a robot log?
A normal log can be altered by whoever compromised the robot. Attestation seals each action to an append-only RFC 6962 transparency log, so a receipt cannot be changed without breaking the chain, and anyone can verify it.
Does RankShield work with ROS 2 and SROS2?
Yes. It layers above ROS 2, SROS2, and DDS-Security and complements them. SROS2 authenticates participants; RankShield authorizes individual actions and emits verifiable receipts.
How do I know which category I already have?
If you can see and alert on activity, you have detection. If you authenticate participants, you have some IAM. If you can prevent an unauthorized action at the actuator and produce a verifiable receipt, you have attestation. Most fleets are missing the third.